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he question of whether central banks should 
react to stock price developments has been 
hotly debated. This discussion has 
intensified since the eruption of the credit crisis. 
According to some analysts, including myself, the 
failure of the US Federal Reserve under Alan 
Greenspan to react to the bubbles in the stock and 
housing markets helps to explain the financial 
excesses and the subsequent crisis.  
There are two schools of thought on the issue of 
whether the central bank should try to influence 
asset prices. The first one, which is well 
represented by the present and former Chairmen of 
the US Federal Reserve, argues that central banks 
should not use the interest rate to influence asset 
prices. The proponents of this view advance several 
arguments. The first argument is that it is difficult 
to identify bubbles ex ante. An extreme version of 
this view denies the existence of bubbles 
altogether. In this view, financial markets are 
efficient and thus asset prices always reflect the 
best available information. Since central banks do 
not possess better information than markets, it 
makes no sense for them to try to influence stock 
prices. The second argument is that even if a 
bubble can be identified ex ante, using the interest 
rate is ineffective to burst a bubble. All the central 
bank can do is to limit the damage once the bubble 
bursts. This school of thought also stresses that by 
keeping the rate of inflation low, the central bank 
contributes to creating an environment of 
sustainable growth in which bubbles are less likely 
to emerge.  
The second school of thought takes the view that 
asset prices are often subject to bubbles and 
crashes. These can have strong pro-cyclical effects 
and can also affect the stability of financial 
markets. Since central banks are responsible for 
financial stability they should monitor asset prices 
and try to prevent the emergence of bubbles (that 
invariably lead to crashes). In this view the use of 
the interest rate is seen as effective in preventing 
bubbles from emerging. It should be noted that few 
economists from this school will argue that the 
central bank should target a particular value of the 
asset price (in the same way as it targets an 
inflation rate). Instead proponents of the second 
school of thought argue that a strategy of ‘leaning 
against the wind’ may be useful to reduce too 
strong movements in asset prices.  
How to analyze this issue? Economists usually 
employ some macroeconomic model and then ask 
the model to answer the question. In this case we 
want the model to answer the question of whether a 
central bank can improve macroeconomic stability 
by reacting to asset price movements. The next 
question then is which model to use. Since the last 
two decades macroeconomics has been dominated 
by the rational expectations paradigm. The present-
day macroeconomic models, the so-called Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium models (DSGE-
models), all incorporate this paradigm. This is a 
world of rational agents who are superbly 
informed. They understand the world in all its 
complexities. Since they all understand the same 
‘Truth’, it is sufficient to model just one agent, the 
representative agent. This agent observes a shock 
and immediately understands its implications 
allowing him to compute the optimal price, 
consumption and production from today into 
eternity. New-Keynesian versions of this model 
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incorporate stickiness in wage and prices, but 
remain firmly embedded in the rational 
expectations paradigm.  
In this DSGE-world there is no room for bubbles 
and crashes. Markets are always efficient, so that 
asset prices reflect underlying fundamentals. Thus 
central banks cannot improve welfare by guiding 
asset prices to other values than those produced by 
efficient markets. Since most central banks these 
days use some form of DSGE-model for policy 
evaluation it will not come as a surprise that these 
central bankers are reluctant to use the interest rate 
to influence stock prices.  
But are the DSGE-models the appropriate 
instruments to study the issue of whether central 
banks should try to prick asset bubbles? I argue that 
they are not for two reasons. First, the scientific 
evidence from other sciences (psychology, brain 
sciences) casts doubts about the plausibility of the 
rational expectations assumption which requires 
agents to understand the full complexity of the 
world in which they live. It is no exaggeration to 
say that there is now strong evidence that 
individual agents suffer from deep cognitive 
problems limiting their capacity to understand and 
to process the complexity of the information they 
receive. Many anomalies that challenge the rational 
expectations assumption have been discovered. I 
just mention ‘anchoring’ effects here, whereby 
agents who do not fully understand the world in 
which they live are highly selective in the way they 
use information and concentrate on the information 
they understand or the information that is fresh in 
their minds. This anchoring effect explains why 
agents often extrapolate recent movements in 
prices. 
Second, models that deny the existence of bubbles 
and crashes are particularly unsuitable to analyze 
the question of whether a central bank should act to 
prevent bubbles in asset prices from emerging. We 
need other models. 
In my modelling approach I take the view that 
agents face cognitive problems in understanding 
and processing information. As a result, they use 
simple rules (‘heuristics’) to guide their behaviour. 
They do this not because they are irrational, but 
rather because the complexity of the world is 
overwhelming. In a way it can be said that using 
heuristics is a rational response of agents who are 
aware of their limited capacity to understand the 
world. These heuristics also contain a bias. I 
assume that some agents are optimistic in their 
forecasting rules and others are pessimistic. This 
leads to a behavioral macroeconomic model in 
which waves of optimism and pessimism (Keynes’ 
‘animal spirits’) arise spontaneously. (For a 
detailed description of the model, see my CEPS 
Working Document No. 305). Note that although 
this model assumes that agents have biased beliefs, 
on average the forecasts are right.  
These endogenously generated cycles in output and 
stock prices are made possible by a self-fulfilling 
mechanism that can be described as follows. A 
series of random shocks creates the possibility that 
optimistic forecasting rules deliver a higher payoff, 
i.e. a lower mean squared forecast error (MSFE). 
This attracts agents that were using pessimistic 
forecasting rules. The ‘contagion-effect’ leads to an 
increasing use of the optimistic beliefs to forecast 
the output, which in turn stimulates aggregate 
demand and leads to a bull stock market. Optimism 
is therefore self-fulfilling. A boom is created. Put 
differently, the contagion effect leads to a 
correlation of beliefs, in this case optimistic ones, 
that propel market prices in one direction. At some 
point, however, negative stochastic shocks make a 
dent in the MSFE of the optimistic beliefs. The 
pessimistic beliefs become attractive and therefore 
fashionable again. The stock market and the 
economy turn around.   
It is in this context that I analyze the question of 
whether central banks can improve macroeconomic 
stability (i.e. lower variability of output and 
inflation) by using the interest rate aimed at 
reducing stock price volatility. I assume that stock 
prices affect both demand and supply. When stock 
prices increase, net equity of firms goes up. As a 
result, banks are more willing to grant better credit 
conditions to firms. This has a positive effect on 
aggregate demand (this is the Bernanke-Gertler 
credit multiplier model). The improved credit 
conditions also lower marginal costs and thus affect 
aggregate supply positively. Stock price declines 
have the opposite effects.  
I then ask the model the question of whether a 
central bank that ‘leans against the wind’ in the 
stock market, i.e. that uses the interest rate to 
reduce the volatility of stock prices improves 
macroeconomic stability. And the answer is: Yes, 
central banks can influence stock prices, and by 
following ‘leaning against the wind’ strategies in 
the stock market, they can improve the tradeoff 
between output and inflation, i.e. they can reduce 
the volatility of both output and inflation.  
So far, this is not really surprising. After all, this is 
a model that produces waves of optimism and 
pessimism in the macroeconomy and to booms and 
busts in the stock market. By manipulating the 
interest rate the central bank changes these ‘animal 
spirits’. What is more surprising is that this result 
only holds in an environment of credible inflation 
targeting. If the inflation target has a high degree of Should central banks target stock prices? | 3 
credibility the model tells us that these ‘leaning 
against the wind’ strategies significantly improve 
macroeconomic stability (output and inflation 
stability). However, these policies aiming at 
reducing the volatility of asset prices by 
manipulating the interest rates do not improve 
macroeconomic stability when inflation targeting 
has no credibility.  
In this sense there is a grain of truth of the first 
school of thought discussed earlier. A credible 
inflation targeting is a powerful tool to stabilize the 
economy. Where this school of thought has it 
wrong is when it confuses necessary and sufficient 
conditions. Inflation targeting is necessary for 
macroeconomic stability, but it is not sufficient. By 
leaning against the waves of excessive optimism 
and pessimism that characterize asset price 
movements, the central bank contributes in 
reducing the scope for bubbles and crashes and in 
so doing helps to stabilize the economy.  
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